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Abstract

ambiguity and impreciseness. Even though the source code
can provide precise information, in it essential features are
tangled with implementation decisions and details.
A formal specification may complement the informal
document, since it can document essential features in a concise and precise manner. A formal behavioral interface
specification language, such as JML [5], is designed exactly for this purpose, i.e., to precisely document both the
syntactic interface and the behavior of program modules. A
formal behavioral interface specification provides not only
a precise document describing the API, but also a formal
foundation for rigorously proving properties about the implementation, including formal reasoning and verification
[1, 8].
In this paper, we present a specification case study of the
Java security package using JML. This work is currently
being done under the Milaap Project, the research goal of
which is to unify and integrate several different verification
methods. During this study, we specified a significant number of core classes of the security package. In this paper
we present some of the interesting classes and discuss the
lessons that we learned from this specification effort. The
case study allowed us to identify several specification patterns that facilitate writing JML specifications. It also permitted us to critically evaluate the effectiveness of JML as
an API documentation language, which led us to a JML
wish list, some of which is discussed in this paper. We
expect our specifications to be a valuable document to the
users of the Java security package, and we believe that our
specification techniques and patterns are applicable to the
specification of other Java packages and frameworks.
Our work is not the first to formally specify Java
packages. The JML distributions available from www.
jmlspecs.org are shipped with specifications of some
JDK classes, such as collection classes. Our work is focused
on the security aspect, and our contribution is not only the
final specifications, but also identification of reusable specification patterns and a critical evaluation of JML. Poll et
al. specified in JML all the classes of the JavaCard API

The Java security package allows a programmer to add
security features to Java applications. Although the package provides a complex application programming interface
(API), its informal description, e.g., Javadoc comments, is
often ambiguous or imprecise. Nonetheless, the security of
an application can be compromised if the package is used
without a concrete understanding of the precise behavior of
the API classes and interfaces, which can be attained via
formal specification. In this paper, we present our experiences in formally specifying the Java security package in
JML, a formal behavior interface specification language for
Java. We illustrate portions of our JML specifications and
discuss the lessons that we learned, from this specification
effort, about specification patterns and the effectiveness of
JML. In addition, we put forward our JML wish list. Our
specifications are not only a precise document for the API
but also provide a foundation for formally reasoning and
verifying the security aspects of applications. We believe
that our specification techniques and patterns can be used
to specify other Java packages and frameworks.

1. Introduction
Java makes it possible to write secure applications by
providing a security model based on a sandbox, an execution environment in which a program runs and the program’s execution is confined within certain bounds [7]. The
security package [9]—classes in the java.security
package as well as those in the security extension—allows
security features to be added to an application. It is necessary to precisely understand the behaviors of these classes
and interfaces because a small misuse of an API can significantly compromise the security of an application. However,
an informal document, such as Javadoc comments, often is
inadequate for precisely specifying the behavior of the API
because of the inherent nature of a natural language, i.e., its
1

[8], and their specification made many of the implicit assumptions underlying the implementation explicit, which
agrees with our findings. Their specifications are written
in a lightweight style, while most of our specifications are
written in a heavyweight style (see Section 5 for a discussion of lightweight versus heavyweight specifications in
JML). Catano and Huisman found a similar result in that
even lightweight use of formal specifications contributed
greatly to the improvement of the quality of applications
[2].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
Java security package and JML are described in Section 2.
Sections 3 and 4 focus on the two main aspects of the security package: the protection mechanism and the cryptographic architecture, presenting brief descriptions and specifications in JML of classes associated with the access controller and the security class, respectively. A discussion of
the results and conclusions of our specification case study
conclude the paper in Sections 5 and 6.

The class AccessController determines, based on the
security policy in effect, whether an access to a resource
should be granted or denied. Any section of code that performs a security-sensitive operation should consult the access controller to verify if the operation is allowed. An operation or access is represented by a permission, and different types of permissions form a class hierarchy rooted at the
abstract class Permission.
Cryptographic Architecture The Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA) deals with authentication and supports algorithm and implementation independence. Algorithm independence is achieved by separating the types of cryptographic engines (or services) from the classes, called engine classes, that provide the functionality of these cryptographic engines. Implementation independence is achieved
by adopting a provider-based architecture, where a provider
is a package or a set of packages that implement one
or more cryptographic services or engine classes. Some
of the JCA core classes are Security (handling all installed providers and security properties), Provider (interface to the concrete implementation of the cryptographic
services), engine classes such as MessageDigest and
Signature, and key and parameter classes such as Key
and AlgorithmParameters.
The code below shows a typical use of engine classes.
The MessageDigest class is an engine class that provides an interface to a message digest (hash) algorithm,
such as MD5 and SHA. A message digest is a secure oneway hash function that takes arbitrary-sized data and returns
a fixed-length hash value.

2. Background
2.1. The Java Security Package
The Java security package (java.security) provides a framework for the Java security architecture, which
can be broadly classified into two different aspects of security: protection mechanism and cryptographic architecture.
Figure 1 illustrates a UML class diagram showing some of
the security classes that we will specify in this paper.
AccessController
{final}

<<use>>

MessageDigest md = MessageDigest.
getInstance("MD5","SUN");
md.update("Hi, JCA!".getBytes());
byte[] hash = md.digest();

Permission

BasicPermission

java.io.FilePermission
{final}

Every engine class implements factory methods, named
getInstance, each of which returns an instance of the
specified algorithm from the optionally specified provider.
To find an appropriate algorithm implementation, the factory methods ask the Security class, which, in turn, consults the available providers (Provider) to check whether
they can supply the desired algorithm. The example code
gets an instance of Sun’s implementation of the MD5 algorithm. The update method adds a sequence of bytes to
the internal buffer, and the digest method computes the
message digest of the bytes stored in the internal buffer.

javax.sound.sampled.AudioPermission
{final}
<<interface>>
PublicKey
MessageDigestSpi

Provider

SignatureSpi

1..*
{ordered}

MessageDigest

<<use>>

Security
{final}

<<interface>>
PrivateKey

<<interface>>
Key

AlgorithmParameters

<<use>>
Signature

Figure 1. Security-related classes

Protection Mechanism The protection mechanism deals
with access control and prevention of unauthorized modifications. It is built upon concepts such as code sources
(locations from which Java classes are obtained), permissions (requests to perform particular operations), policies
(all the specific permissions that should be granted to specific code sources), and protection domains (particular code
sources and permissions granted to those code sources) [7].

2.2. JML
The Java Modeling Language (JML) [5] is a formal behavioral interface specification language for the Java programming language, which describes both the syntactic interface and the behavior of Java program modules, such as
2

classes and interfaces. The syntactic interface of a Java
class or interface, commonly called an application programming interface (API), consists of the signatures of its methods and the names and types of its fields. The behavior
of a program module is specified by writing, among other
things, pre and postconditions of the methods exported by
the module. The assertions in pre and postconditions are
written using a subset of Java expressions and are annotated
in the source code. The pre and postconditions are viewed
as a contract between the client and the implementor of the
module. The client must guarantee that, before calling a
method m exported by the module, m’s precondition holds,
and the implementor must guarantee that, after such a call,
m’s postcondition holds.

that we used to factor out common or general properties
into the superclass and leave the specifics to subclasses.

public abstract class Permission
implements Guard, java.io.Serializable {
private /*@ spec_public @*/ String name;
/*@ public normal_behavior
@ assignable this.name;
@ ensures this.name == name; @*/
public Permission(String name);
/*@ public normal_behavior
@ ensures \result <==>
@
(getClass() == p.getClass()
@
&& jmlImpliesPerm(p)); @*/
public abstract /*@ pure @*/ boolean
implies(/*@ non_null @*/ Permission p);

3. Access Control
The access control mechanism is built upon concepts
such as code sources, permissions, policies, and protection
domains [7]. A permission—an encapsulation of a request
to perform a particular operation—is a key concept underlying the access control mechanism and provides an interesting aspect on formalization, as there exist several types of
permissions with some sharing certain common properties,
and they are organized into a class hierarchy. In this section, we specify representative methods of the permission
classes.

/** Does this permission implies p?
* To be overridden by subclasses */
/*@ public model pure boolean
@ jmlImpliesPerm(non_null Permission p);
@*/
// ...
}

Figure 2. Specification of class Permission

3.1. Permission Classes
Permission The abstract class Permission is the ancestor of all permission classes (see Figure 2). In JML,
specifications are typically annotated in source code as special comments, i.e., //@ and a pair of /*@ and @*/, and
the specification of a method precedes its declaration. A
method specification can consist of, among other things, a
precondition (specified in the requires clause), a frame
axiom (specified in the assignable clause), and a normal
or exceptional postcondition (specified in the ensures or
signals clause).
All permissions have a name—the interpretation of
which depends on the subclass—and several abstract methods (e.g., implies) that define the semantics of the particular subclass. The JML modifier spec public states that
the field is treated as public for specification purpose; e.g.,
it can be used in public specifications.
The specification of the implies method illustrates a
specification pattern that we use to leave the specification
of subclass-specific properties to subclasses. The keyword
normal-behavior specifies the behavior of the method
when it terminates normally, i.e., without throwing an exception. The pure modifier states that the method has no
side-effect; only pure methods can appear in JML assertions. The postcondition states that the method should re-

A permission, a specific action that code is allowed to
perform, consists of three components: type, name, and actions. The type, which specifies the type of the permission,
is represented by a particular Java class that implements the
permission. The name is based on permission type, e.g.,
the name of a file permission is a file or directory name,
and a few permissions require no name. The actions also
vary based on the permission type, and many permissions
have no actions associated with them. The actions specifies
what may be done to the target of the permission, e.g., a file
permission may specify that a particular file can be read,
written, deleted, executed, or some combination of these.
The permission classes implement different permission
types and are organized in a class hierarchy. In this paper
we specify two representative classes and their superclasses,
one for name-based permissions and the other for the nameand-action-based permissions. Instead of specifying all the
APIs of the permission classes, we focus on one method,
implies, that determines whether one permission implies
another permission. The implies method is one of the
most important methods of permission classes because it is
the primary method used by the access controller to make
access decisions. We illustrate the specification technique
3

turn true if and only if (a) the given permission, p, is of the
same type as the receiver, and (b) jmlImpliesPerm(p)
holds. Property (a) is common to all permission classes
and, thus, is specified in this class. However, determining whether the receiver implies the argument permission
is subclass-specific because different subclasses may have
different names or actions, and their interpretations may be
different. Thus, it cannot be completely specified in the
class Permission. Our approach is to delegate the specification responsibility to subclasses by introducing a model
method, i.e., jmlImpliesPerm, as shown in property
(b). A model method is a specification-only method and
can be used only in assertions. Each (concrete) subclass is
responsible for overriding this model method to specify the
subclass-specific precise meaning of the implies method
(see BasicPermission and FilePermission below).

/*@ also
@ public normal_behavior
@ old String n1 = name;
@ old String n2 = p.name;
@ ensures \result <==> (
@
n1.equals(n2) || "*".equals(n1) ||
@
(n1.endsWith(".*") &&
@
n1.length() < n2.length()) &&
@
n1.regionMatches(
@
0, n2, 0, n1.length()-1));
@ public pure model boolean jmlImpliesPerm(
@ non_null Permission p) { /*...*/ } @*/

The class AudioPermission defined in the package
javax.sound.sampled is an example of a concrete
class that implements a simple named permission. It represents access rights to the audio system resources, and the
permission string (or name) can be play, record, and the
wildcard (*). The class only defines a constructor; all the
permission methods are inherited from the superclasses.

BasicPermission This is an abstract subclass and implements permissions that have a name (or target) string but
do not support actions. It implements hierarchical property
names, i.e., names with dots. An asterisk may appear by
itself, or if immediately preceded by a “.”, it may appear
at the end of the name, to signify a wildcard match (see
the implies method below). The BasicPermission
class does not introduce any new state component. However, it constrains the inherited state by requiring the name
to be non-null, as stated in the invariant clause below.

FilePermission The class FilePermission is a final,
concrete subclass of Permission and consists of a pathname and a set of actions. An action represents access that
can be granted to a pathname, and a possible value is “read”,
“write”, “execute”, or “delete”. The pathname is modeled
by the name field inherited from Permission, and the
actions are modeled by a model field actions of type
JMLValueSet (see below).

//@ public invariant name != null;

//@ public model non_null JMLValueSet actions;
//@ public invariant
//@
actions.isSubset(FILE_ACTIONS);

/*@ public normal_behavior
@ assignable this.name;
@ ensures this.name == name; @*/
public BasicPermission(
/*@ non_null @*/ String name);

The JML model class JMLValueSet, from the package org.jmlspecs.model, defines immutable sets that
use equals for a membership test. The invariant clause
states that actions can contain only valid action names;
FILE ACTIONS, not shown here, is a specification-only
constant denoting the set of all file actions.
In the implementation, the actions are represented as
a bit mask (see below). The JML represents clause
specifies an abstraction function that maps program values
such as a bit mask to abstract values such as a JMLValueSet; the model method toSet that does this mapping is
not shown in this paper. That is, the value of the model
field actions is given by the program field mask. The
in clause states that mask belongs to the data group of
actions, meaning that a method that can change the value
of actions also can change the value of mask [6]. Note
that the represents clause is private and, thus, is for the
implementor, not for the client of this class.

The BasicPermission class provides a simple wildcarding capability, e.g., “*” implies permission for any target and “x.*” implies permission for any target that begins
with “x.”. This is implemented by the implies method,
the behavior of which is specified below indirectly by overriding the inherited model method jmlImpliesPerm
(see below). The ensures redundantly clause specifies facts that can be inferred from other assertions, such
as those inherited from the superclass, and the old clause
introduces a short name for an expression.
/*@ also
@ public normal_behavior
@ ensures_redundantly \result ==>
@
(p instanceof BasicPermission)
@
&& jmlImpliesPerm(p); @*/
public /*@ pure @*/ boolean implies(
/*@ non_null @*/ Permission p);

private transient int mask; //@ in actions;
//@ private represents actions <- toSet(mask);

4

The constructor establishes the invariant about actions
by requiring the action string, acts, to be a sequence of
comma-separated file actions (see below). This is indirectly
asserted by stating that toSet(acts) should be a subset
of FILE ACTIONS. The overloaded model method toSet
converts a sequence of comma-separated strings to a JMLValueSet. As shown below, a model method also may have
the method body. The constructor is allowed to mutate the
model field actions and, thus, is allowed to change the
program field mask to initialize it.

file path. Its postcondition asserts that the return value
be true if and only if the receiver’s action set includes all the actions of the argument permission, p, and
jmlImpliesPath(p.name) is true. A new model
method jmlImpliesPath, not shown in this paper, formulates the implies relation on file path names, e.g., both
“/tmp/*”and “/-” imply “/tmp/t.txt”.

/*@ public normal_behavior
@ requires toSet(acts).isSubset(
@
FILE_ACTIONS);
@ assignable name, actions;
@ ensures name == path &&
@
actions.equals(toSet(acts)); @*/
public FilePermission(
/*@ non_null @*/ String path,
/*@ non_null @*/ String acts);

The Java Cryptographic Architecture (JCA) includes
APIs for message digests, digital signatures, and key and
certificate management. Another feature of JCA is that it
is based on the provider architecture to support multiple
and interoperable cryptography implementations. In this
section we describe key JCA classes such as Security,
MessageDigest, and Signature;

4. Cryptography

4.1. Security Class

/*@ public model pure JMLValueSet toSet(
@ non_null String acts) {
@ JMLValueSet r = new JMLValueSet();
@ StringTokenizer tokens =
@
new StringTokenizer(acts, ",");
@ while (tokens.hasMoreTokens())
@
r = r.insert(new JMLString(tokens
@
.nextToken().trim().toLowerCase()));
@ return r;
@ } @*/

This final class manages the installed providers and the
security properties, i.e., it centralizes all security properties
and common security methods. For this, it provides a set of
static methods, including methods for adding new providers
or properties, retrieving existing providers or properties,
and removing existing providers. All of these are typical
methods for managing a collection of data. The class also
defines a method named getAlgorithms that returns a
set of strings containing the names of all available algorithms or types for the specified cryptographic service, e.g.,
message digest and signature. In this section, we specify
the getAlgorithms method, but first let us define the
abstract model of the class Security.

The specification of the overriding implies method is
shown below. As in the class BasicPermission, its precise behavior is specified by overriding the model method
jmlImpliesPerm.

/*@ public static model non_null
@ JMLObjectSequence jmlPrs;
@ public static invariant
@ !jmlPrs.has(null) &&
@ (\forall Object o; jmlPrs.has(o);
@
o instanceof Provider) &&
@ jmlPrs.size() == jmlPrs.toSet().size();
@*/

/*@ also
@ public normal_behavior
@ ensures_redundantly \result <==>
@
(p.getClass() == FilePermission.class
@
&& jmlImpliesPerm(p)); @*/
public /*@ pure @*/ boolean implies(
/*@non_null@*/ Permission p);
/*@ also
@ public normal_behavior
@ ensures \result <==> (
@
actions.isSuperset(
@
((FilePermission)p).actions)
@
&& jmlImpliesPath(p.name));
@ public model pure boolean
@ jmlImpliesPerm(non_null Permission p);
@*/

private static /*@ non_null @*/
Provider[] providers; //@ in jmlPrs;
/*@ private static represents jmlPrs <@ JMLObjectSequence.convertFrom(providers);
@*/

This specification shows an interesting pattern. For our
purpose, it is sufficient and even advantageous to model
the class as a sequence of providers, but the implementation uses an array of providers, a private field named
providers. We may use this array as our abstract model,

The jmlImpliesPerm method defines the implies
relation of file permissions, based on both actions and
5

but we opted for sequences by introducing a model field
jmlPrs. The resulting specification is more abstract and
maintainable. For example, a change of representation has
only one affect, i.e., it affects the represents clause; the
rest of the specification, such as pre and postconditions, remains the same. In addition, sequences are a lot easier to
manipulate in pre and postconditions. As stated in the invariant, jmlPrs contains only instances of Providers,
no null, and no duplicates.
The specification of getAlgorithms is given below.
It looks a bit complicated due to nested quantifiers, but
it precisely documents that the returned value is a set of
strings, the elements of which are collected from the keys
of the properties (maps) of all providers. The elements are
built from the keys that contain no blanks and the prefixes
of which match case-insensitively the given service name
(n) by discarding the matching prefix and the next character (“.”). For example, if the key is “MessageDigest.MD5”
and the service name is “MessageDigest”, then “MD5” is
added to the result.

MessageDigest This engine class provides an interface to
a secure one-way hash function that takes arbitrary-sized
data and returns a fixed-length hash value, called a message
digest. We specify all the methods (i.e., getInstance,
update, and digest) used in the example in Section 2.1.
For these methods, it is sufficient to model a message digest object as a sequence of bytes to be digested, as shown
below; i.e., we ignore other implementation fields such as
provider.

/*@ public normal_behavior
@ requires n.length() > 0 &&
@
!n.endsWith(".");
@ ensures (\forall Object o;
@
\result.contains(o);
@
(o instanceof String)) &&
@
(\forall String s;
@
\result.contains(s) <==>
@
(\exists Provider p; jmlPrs.has(p);
@
(\exists String k;
@
algKeys(p, n).contains(k);
@
s.equals(k.toUpperCase()
@
.substring(n.length()+1)))));
@*/
public static /*@ pure non_null @*/ Set
getAlgorithms(/*@ non_null @*/ String n);

/*@ public normal_behavior
@ requires Security.getProvider(p) !=
@
null && (* alg is available from p *);
@ ensures \fresh(\result) &&
@
\result.data.isEmpty() &&
@
\result.getAlgorithm().equals(alg) &&
@
\result.getProvider().getName()
@
.equals(p);
@ also
@ public exceptional_behavior
@ requires Security.getProvider(p)
@
!= null && (* no such alg from p *);
@ signals (NoSuchAlgorithmException e1);
@ also
@ public exceptional_behavior
@ requires Security.getProvider(p) != null;
@ signals (NoSuchProviderException e2);
@*/
public static /*@ pure @*/ MessageDigest
getInstance(/*@ non_null @*/ String alg,
/*@ non_null @*/ String p)
throws NoSuchAlgorithmException,
NoSuchProviderException;

/*@ public model non_null JMLValueSequence
@ data; initially data.isEmpty(); @*/

The JML model class JMLValueSequence, imported
from the org.jmlspecs.models package, defines an
immutable sequence of values. Initially, the model field
data is empty, i.e., there is nothing to digest. The class
MessageDigest defines several factory methods to create new instances. Specified below is the one that takes an
algorithm name (e.g., SHA and MD5) and a provider name.

Given a provider and a service name, the model method
algKeys returns the set of keys of the provider that
contain no blanks and the prefixes of which match caseinsensitively the given service name.

4.2. Engine Classes

This specification uses informal descriptions in its preconditions. In JML, one can escape from formality by enclosing plain English or other applicable languages in a pair
of (* and *). If the named algorithm is available from the
named provider, this method should return a new object of
type MessageDigest; otherwise, it should throw an exception. The \fresh expression in the ensures clause
asserts that the object is newly created, i.e., it does not exist
in the pre-state but does exist in the post-state. The specification also shows that one can mix formal and informal
descriptions in JML assertions.

The engine classes provide different cryptographic services, such as message digests and digital signatures. All
engine classes are abstract and define several factory methods named getInstance to create objects that implement specific cryptographic algorithms. All factory methods take an algorithm name, and some also take an optional
provider name or object. If the provider is not specified, an
algorithm available from the default provider is returned. In
addition to factory methods, each engine class defines a set
of service-specific API methods.
6

One uses update methods to append data to a message
digest object and then calls digest methods to actually
compute a message digest of the accumulated data. There
are several forms of update and digest methods. The ones
used in Section 2.1 are specified below.

not allow a protocol property to be expressed explicitly, we
encode it as a finite state machine in pre and postconditions.
For example, the following gives partial specifications of
the initSign and sign methods.

/*@ public normal_behavior
@ assignable data;
@ ensures data.equals(
@
\old(data.concat(toSeq(d))));
@*/
public void update(/*@ non_null @*/ byte[] d);

protected /*@ spec_public @*/ int state;
//@ initially state == UNINITIALIZED;
//@ assignable state;
//@ ensures state == SIGN;
public final void initSign(PrivateKey k)
throws InvalidKeyException;
//@ requires state == SIGN;
public final byte[] sign()
throws SignatureException;

/*@ public static model pure JMLValueSequence
@ toSeq(non_null byte[] b) {
@ JMLValueSequence r
@
= new JMLValueSequence();
@ for (int i = 0; i < b.length; i++)
@
r = r.insertBack(new JMLByte(b[i]));
@ return r;
@ } @*/

The field state represents the current protocol state
and the allowed transitions are specified by manipulating
it in pre and postconditions of the methods involved. For
example, the initSign method sets the state’s value
to the constant SIGN, and the sign method requires that it
be called in a state where the state’s value is SIGN.

/*@ public normal_behavior
@ assignable data;
@ ensures data.isEmpty() &&
@
(* \result is hash of \old(data) *);
@*/
public /*@ non_null @*/ byte[] digest();

5. Discussion
An interface specification of a module may be written at
different abstraction levels for different users, e.g., a highly
abstract specification for the module’s client and a more
implementation-oriented specification for the module’s implementor. JML facilitates writing specifications at different abstraction levels and, through specification visibility
and model elements, mixing them in a single file. In our
case study, we attempted to produce client-oriented specifications by defining abstract models for classes and interfaces. Occasionally, however, we made connections to the
representations through private abstraction functions (e.g.,
the Security class in Section 4.1).
Writing an interface specification is an iterative and incremental process, often starting from the definition of an
abstract model to the specification of each method. We
found that a concise mathematical notation such as Z, which
makes it easy to see commonalities and variations of different classes, especially when a complex class hierarchy is
involved, is an excellent tool to sketch out abstract models. We also used UML class diagrams to identify abstract models: First, we reverse engineered a class diagram
from source code to highlight various relationships among
classes, and then extended or decorated it with model elements such as model fields and classes. Since JML facilitates incremental development of specifications, often we
started with an informal/lightweight specification, which
evolved into a formal/heavyweight one. Although JML also
allows multiple specifications of a module to be in separate

The update method is specified in terms of the model
method toSeq, which converts an array of bytes to a sequence of bytes. The postcondition states that the argument
bytes are appended at the end; the expression \old(e) denotes the value of e evaluated in the pre-state. The digest
method has a side-effect in that it also trashes the accumulated data.
Signature This engine class provides an interface to compute and verify digital signatures. It uses a private key to
sign or produce a new digital signature and a public key to
verify a signature; both keys are implemented as interfaces,
i.e., PrivateKey and PublicKey. The API of this class
is similar to that of MessageDigest, however, an interesting aspect of this class from a specification perspective
is that the same object may be used for both signing data
and verifying signed data. This means that methods should
be called in a particular order. For example, to sign data,
one must first call one of the initSign methods that initializes the object by supplying a private key; then call the
update methods, possibly several times, to append data;
and finally call one of the sign methods. A similar sequence of method calls (i.e., initVerify, update, and
verify) are required to verify signed data.
But how can this protocol property, i.e., ordering dependency among method calls, be specified? Since JML does
7

files, we didn’t explore this refinement feature in our incremental development.
Another feature of JML that we used heavily in our case
study is informal descriptions. This feature allowed us to
tune the level of formality and mix formal and informal text
in our specifications. We prefer a simple English description when a formalization does not add much or is practically impossible to completely formalize (e.g., the digest
method in Section 4.2).
Additionally, we identified several features missing in
JML. For example, we could not separate and specify
cleanly the ordering of dependencies among methods [4].
We had to mix the so-called protocol properties with functional properties in pre and postconditions by encoding
them as finite state machines (e.g., the Signature class
in Section 4.2). Writing such specifications is laborious and
error-prone, and, since the protocol properties have to be
inferred, the specifications become hard to understand. Another missing feature may be a more succinct and expressive
notation to manipulate mathematical structures such as sets
and sequences, e.g., something like Haskell’s list comprehension notation. Although JML provides so-called model
classes for such mathematical structures, we found that the
use of these classes often becomes cumbersome and verbose, e.g., we had to convert values back and forth between
Java types and JML types used by model classes.
Finally, we mention several JML specification techniques or patterns that we used recurrently in this case study.
The most frequently used pattern is “abstract with model
fields”, which produces an abstract, client-oriented specification that is easy to maintain and allows runtime assertion
checking. The approach is to introduce model fields to define the abstract model of a class and to write pre and postconditions in terms of the model fields (see Section 4.1).
If the representations of the model fields are known, private abstraction functions may be specified to make pre and
postconditions checkable at runtime [3]. Another pattern
illustrated in this paper is “delegate to model methods”,
which is used to specify method overrides (see Section 3.1).
The idea is for a superclass to delegate to a subclass the responsibility of specifying an overridden method. The approach is to introduce a model method to specify the behavior of an overridden method and to let a subclass to override
the model method to provide a subclass-specific behavior
specification. A related pattern, “know your class” also allows the specification of class-specific behavior by using the
getClass method in assertions.

scriptions obtained from the Javadoc comments of the
source code. We quickly found that in many places the
descriptions were incomplete or ambiguous. Thus, we resorted to the source code and experimented with it to resolve
ambiguity and to determine the precise behavior of the API.
Given our specification, we expect other Java programmers
to be able to avoid this “code experimentation”. We also
expect that our specifications will facilitate the use of the
Java security API and increase the reliability of the code on
which it is based.
We are in the process of verifying both our specifications
and the source code using various JML tools. All our specifications will be soon available from our project website at
opuntia.cs.utep.edu/milaap.
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6. Conclusion
We documented formally in JML a significant portion
of the java.security package and its extensions. The
starting point of our specifications was informal API de8

